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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-1417 
_____________ 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
  
DESHAWN KING, a/k/a Wop, a/k/a Mike 
          
DeShawn King, 
    Appellant  
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 5-13-cr-00417-001) 
District Judge: Honorable James Knoll Gardner 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 18, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO, and VAN ANTWERPEN,* Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 28, 2016) 
______________ 
 
OPINION** 
______________ 
                                                   
 * The Honorable Franklin Van Antwerpen participated in the decision in this case, 
but died before the opinion was filed.  This opinion is filed by a quorum of the court.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 46; Third Circuit I.O.P. 12.1(b).  
 ** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 DeShawn King (“Appellant” or “King”) entered an open guilty plea to one count 
of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by force, fraud or coercion, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1594, and four related substantive counts, under 18 U.S.C. §1591, each 
involving different victims.  Ultimately, King was sentenced to 293 months in prison, a 
$1,000 fine, and 15 years of supervised release, which included several special 
conditions.  King now appeals, raising two separate issues, neither of which was 
preserved.  First, King argues that the District Court erred by failing to properly advise 
him under the recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. §455(a) & (e), before accepting his waiver of the 
District Court’s involvement in a potentially disqualifying event.  Second, King argues 
that the District Court erred by imposing two special conditions of supervised release 
regarding minors that are not reasonably related to Mr. King’s history and are more 
restrictive than necessary.  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the portion of the 
judgment that imposes the special conditions of supervised release restricting King’s 
interaction with minors and remand the case to the District Court to either: (1) provide an 
explanation and justification for those special conditions and reimpose them, or (2) enter 
an amended judgment omitting those special conditions of supervised release.  We will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court in all other respects. 
I 
 By his own admission, King’s crimes were “abhorrent.”  Appellant’s Br. 3.  King 
and his co-defendant, Daniel Blount, “were involved in a conspiracy to distribute heroin, 
which also involved a prostitution business in and around Allentown, Pennsylvania.”  
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Appellant’s Br. 4.  King and Blount “convinced heroin addicts who purchased drugs from 
them to work for them in exchange for heroin, money, and housing.”  Appellant’s Br. 4.  
King and Blount “collected the money earned by the women,” and “manipulated the 
women’s access to heroin.”  Appellant’s Br. 4.  To force their continued participation in 
this repugnant enterprise, King and Blount would threaten and assault the four women 
under their control.  Simply put, King and Blount were violent and abusive pimps and 
drug dealers.   
  King and Blount were indicted on September 5, 2013.  Count One charged King 
and Blount with conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, under 
18 U.S.C. § 1594(c); Counts Two and Three charged King and Blount with sex 
trafficking by force, fraud or coercion, under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); and Counts Four and 
Five charged King and Blount with attempted sex trafficking by force, fraud or coercion, 
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 1594(a).  App. 26-37.  King entered an open guilty plea on 
January 10, 2014.  In doing so, King understood that these crimes carried a mandatory 
minimum term of 15 years in prison, and that the maximum term was life in prison.   
 The Honorable James Knoll Gardner conducted King’s sentencing hearing over 
the course of two days, January 15, 2015, and February 6, 2015.  Approximately halfway 
through the first day of the sentencing hearing, Judge Gardner summoned counsel for 
King and the Government to sidebar.  At sidebar, Judge Gardner informed counsel that 
approximately a year earlier he had attended the last five minutes of an Inn of Court 
meeting, during which a panel of members gave a presentation based on the facts of 
King’s case.  Judge Gardner explained that he had arrived late to the meeting, was 
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distracted by other events while he was there, and did not pay attention to the 
presentation.1  After hearing this, the Government lodged no objection and King’s 
attorney requested two minutes to speak with his client.  Thereafter, King spoke privately 
with his attorney for approximately one minute.  King’s attorney then returned to sidebar 
and informed Judge Gardner that King “has no problem whatsoever with Your Honor 
continuing with this hearing.”  App. 182.  The sidebar then concluded and Judge Gardner 
conducted an on-the-record colloquy with King regarding this Inn of Court meeting.  
During that colloquy King acknowledged that he: (1) had time to speak with his attorney 
about Judge Gardner’s attendance at this meeting; (2) had time to ask his attorney any 
questions he had and that his attorney answered those questions to his satisfaction; (3) 
understood his attorney’s answers to those questions; (4) had enough time to speak with 
his attorney about this issue; and (5) had no problem with Judge Gardner’s continued 
involvement in his sentencing.  App. 182-84.  Both attorneys declined the District Court’s 
invitation to add anything to the colloquy, and neither objected.  After hearing from 
witnesses and counsel for the parties, the District Court adjourned the sentencing 
proceedings before imposing a sentence.    
 The second portion of King’s sentencing hearing took place on February 6, 2015.  
In the three-week interval between the first and second days of his sentencing hearing, 
King did not move for the recusal of Judge Gardner or otherwise object to Judge 
                                                   
 
1
 Judge Gardner explained that he was so distracted that he did not even realize the 
presentation was based on the facts of King’s case – he only discovered this fact the day 
after the presentation when one of his law clerks who attended the Inn of Court meeting 
explained the connection.    
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Gardner’s continued involvement in the sentencing.  In addition, King did not object to 
Judge Gardner’s involvement on February 6, 2015, either before or after King’s sentence 
was imposed.  Ultimately, the District Court ordered that King be imprisoned for a term 
of 293 months on each of Counts One through Five, all running concurrently.  King’s 
sentence also included a $1,000 fine, and 15 years of supervised release.  King’s 
supervised release carried numerous special conditions.  Among other things, those 
conditions required King to: (1) “report to the United States Probation Office any regular 
contact with children of either sex under the age of 18;” and (2) “not obtain employment 
or perform volunteer work which includes regular contact with children under the age of 
18.”  App. 217.  This timely appeal followed.   
II 
        The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  On appeal, King raises two issues: (1) whether the District 
Court sufficiently advised King of his rights under the recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. §455(a) 
& (e), before accepting King’s waiver of the District Court’s involvement in a potentially 
disqualifying event; and (2) whether the District Court erred in imposing two conditions 
of supervised release that restricted King’s interactions with minors.2  We address each 
issue in turn. 
                                                   
 
2
 Neither of King’s claims were preserved, so our review is for plain error.  United 
States v. Dahl, --- F.3d ----, 2016 WL 4394538, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 2016).  Plain error 
requires a finding of “(1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and 
(4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d 309, 313-14 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation 
omitted). 
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A 
 The federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, provides, in relevant part, that: 
  (a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall  
   disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might  
   reasonably be questioned. 
  . . . . 
  (e) . . . Where the ground for disqualification arises only under   
   subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a  
   full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification. 
 
 “The test for recusal under § 455(a) is whether a reasonable person, with 
knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned.”  In re Kennsington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004).  Under 
subsection (a), questions of impartiality must be viewed on “an objective basis, so that 
what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.”  Liteky v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994).  King argues that “[t]he district court correctly 
identified that the discussion about Mr. King’s case at the Inn of Court meeting he and 
his law clerks attended created a reasonable basis to question to court’s impartiality.”  
Appellant’s Br. 11.  We disagree. 
 Judge Gardner’s limited attendance at the Inn of Court meeting was far too brief 
and his involvement was far too tangential to create a situation in which Judge Gardner’s 
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  Accordingly, while 
it was prudent judicial practice for Judge Gardner to advise all counsel and King of this 
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situation prior to imposing a sentence,3 the alleged “ground for disqualification” here did 
not necessitate a waiver from King under 28 U.S.C. § 455(e).4   
 Our precedential opinion in United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 
2013), informs our resolution of this issue.5  In Ciavarella, the defendant/appellant 
affirmatively sought the recusal of the district court judge because, among other things, 
the judge received nearly 200 letters from the public regarding the case and responded to 
seven of those letters.  Id. at 721.  Despite the fact that some of those seven responses 
expressed the judge’s personal opinions about the defendant and the case before him, we 
found that section 455(a) did not require recusal.  Id. at 723.  By contrast, Judge 
Gardner’s extra-judicial involvement with King’s case was much less significant – he 
attended the last five minutes of a presentation that was based on King’s case.  In 
addition, the record reflects that Judge Gardner wasn’t paying attention during his brief 
attendance – he only learned about the presentation topic on the following day, after his 
                                                   
 3 We disagree with King’s argument that the District Court, in raising this issue, 
“implicitly acknowledged” that the Inn of Court meeting triggered 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  
Appellant’s Br. 11.  Indeed, the record reflects that it is Judge Gardner’s practice 
“whenever [he] ha[s] any connection with a case, no matter how slight, to advise counsel 
of that on the record.”  App. 179-80 (emphasis added). 
 4 We note that: (1) Judge Gardner informed all counsel of the circumstances at 
sidebar; (2) King briefly and privately spoke with his counsel about the circumstances; 
and (3) Judge Gardner conducted and on-the-record colloquy with King about the 
circumstances, after which King agreed to have Judge Gardner continue with the 
sentencing hearing.  
 5 In considering this appeal we are mindful of the crucial role that section 455 
plays in our system of justice, as it “addresses not only fairness to the litigants but also 
the public’s confidence in the judiciary.”  In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776 
(3d Cir. 1992).  Nevertheless, we are confident that neither purpose is offended by our 
decision today.  The circumstances presented by this appeal are insufficient to negatively 
implicate either judicial fairness to King or the public’s confidence in the judiciary. 
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law clerk informed him.  Furthermore, unlike the judge in Ciavarella, at no time did 
Judge Gardner express his personal opinions about King or King’s case.  It is clear that 
Judge Gardner’s interaction was more fleeting and less consequential than the interaction 
of the judge in Ciavarella, whose recusal we held was not required under section 455(a).   
 In sum, Judge Gardner’s impartiality could not reasonably be questioned under 
these circumstances, and thus did not require recusal under section 455(a) or a waiver 
under section 455(e). 
B 
 King argues that it was plain error for the District Court to impose two special 
conditions of supervised release that impaired King’s interactions with minors.  The 
Government agrees.  As do we. 
 “Though district courts have broad discretion in fashioning special conditions of 
supervised release, this discretion is not unfettered.”  United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 
400, 405 (3d Cir. 2010).  A district court may impose conditions of supervised release if 
they are required by statute, or if they are “reasonably related” to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the 
achievement of adequate deterrence, the protection of the public, and the defendant’s 
rehabilitative needs.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1); United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 
248 (3d Cir. 2005).  The conditions must involve no “greater deprivation of liberty than is 
reasonably necessary” to promote these enumerated purposes.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2); 
see Pruden, 398 F.3d at 248.  A “reasonably related” condition must relate in a “tangible 
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way” to “the crime or something in the defendant’s history.”  Pruden, 398 F.3d at 249; 
Heckman, 592 F.3d at 405.   
 “[A] condition with no basis in the record, or with only the most tenuous basis, 
will inevitably violate §3583(d)(2)’s command that such conditions ‘involve[] no greater 
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.’”  Pruden, 398 F.3d at 249.  
Accordingly, a district court must provide an on-the-record explanation and justification 
for the sentence it imposes, including special conditions of supervised release.  See 
United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We have consistently required 
that district courts explain and justify conditions of supervised release.”); see also United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (noting that “District courts 
must provide their explanations and justifications while going through three steps at 
sentencing,” because those explanations and justifications are necessary to facilitate 
meaningful appellate review). 
 The Government concedes that “the conditions that restricted King’s interaction 
with minors are not reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of King’s 
offense.”  Appellee’s Br. 27.  In addition, the record is devoid of any explanation or 
justification for the imposition of the special conditions related to minors.  We agree with 
the parties that these conditions must be vacated. 
 King asks us to remand this case for resentencing.  He argues that a full 
resentencing “avoids any speculation over the reason for the district court’s error.”  
Appellant’s Reply Br. 6.  On the other hand, the Government believes that the 
appropriate remedy is to “remand the case for the limited purpose of vacating the special 
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conditions relating to minors, and direct the district court to enter an amended judgment 
reflecting this change while leaving all other aspects of the judgment intact.”  Appellee’s 
Br. 28.  Here, we do not believe that a full resentencing is necessary.  Accordingly, we 
will vacate the portion of the judgment that imposes the special conditions of supervised 
release relating to minors and remand the case to the District Court to either: (1) provide 
an explanation and justification for those special conditions and reimpose them,6 or (2) 
enter an amended judgment omitting those special conditions of supervised release. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the portion of the judgment that imposes 
the special conditions of supervised release relating to minors and remand the case to the 
District Court to either: (1) provide an explanation and justification for those special 
conditions and reimpose them, or (2) enter an amended judgment omitting those special 
conditions of supervised release.  We will affirm the judgment of the District Court in all 
other respects. 
                                                   
 
6 If the District Court elects to reimpose these two special conditions of supervised 
release on remand, “the Court must provide a sufficiently detailed explanation of its 
reasoning to permit meaningful appellate review.”  Miller, 594 F.3d at 188.     
